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Abstract 
Two experiments examined the impact of response-independent outcome delivery on 
human rates of response and judgments of control in an instrumental conditioning task.  In 
Experiment 1, when participants responded on a schedule with a relatively high probability of 
a response producing an outcome, a random ratio (RR-5), judgments of control declined as 
rates of response-independent outcomes increased.  However, when response-dependent 
outcomes were delivered with a relatively low probability (RR-15), increasing the rate of 
response-independent outcomes increased rates of response and judgments of control.  
Experiment 2 replicated this effect, but also noted a differential effect of response-
independent outcome and response-independent sensory presentations on response rate and 
judgments of causal effectiveness.  Ratings of the context in which the conditioning occurred 
suggested these were correlated with total outcome presentation, and that the role of context 
on response rate and judgments of control may be important to consider. 
 
Key words: judgment of control, response rate, response-independent outcomes, context 
conditioning, humans.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments of control  -  3 
Understanding the conditions impacting judgments of control is important across a 
range of areas; basic cognitive functioning (Allan, 1993; Cheng, 1997; Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1986; Nevin and Grace, 2000), applications in psychopathologies (Alloy and Abramson, 
1979; Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2012), development of therapies (Dimidjian, Barrera, 
Martell, Muñoz, and Lewinsohn, 2011; Koller and Kaplan, 1978), as well as in social 
(Crocker, 1981) and economic (Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman, 2003; 
Reed, 1999) psychology.  The circumstances under which the causal structure of the 
environment can be understood are also thought to be important across species (Alloy and 
Tabachnik, 1984; Wasserman, 1990).  The latter suggestion has prompted a range of studies 
using procedures that are analogous to classical (Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2011; Miller 
and Matute, 1996a) and instrumental (Reed, 1999; 2001a; 2001b; Wasserman, Chatlosh, and 
Neunaber, 1983) conditioning to explore the factors implicated in developing judgments of 
causation.  Although these procedures do not employ ‘biologically’ relevant stimuli (like 
food), they share procedural similarities with conditioning studies in which a response or 
stimuli is presented prior to an outcome.   
The similarity of findings between causal reasoning and learning studies depends on a 
wide number of factors (Miller and Matute, 1996b), including whether the task requires the 
individual to gain outcomes or assess the response-outcome relationships (Matute, 1996; 
Reed, 2001a).  In fact, different processes operate when the outcome is hedonically- or 
biological-neutral, as in most tasks of causal reasoning (Blanco et al., 2011), and when the 
outcome has some hedonic (Reed, 1994) or biological (Miller and Matute, 1996b) 
significance.  The current series of experiments focuses on exploring causal judgments in a 
task retaining significant components of an instrumental conditioning procedure – often 
termed a ‘naturalistic procedure’ (Matute, 1996). 
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Most theories of human causal judgment can accommodate the finding that outcomes 
presented in the absence of an action typically decrease ratings of causal effectiveness (Allan, 
1993; Cheng, 1997; Rescorla-Wagner, 1972).  Although this effect has been noted in studies 
of causal judgment (Wasserman et al., 1983) and instrumental learning (Zeiler, 1968), some 
findings suggest an opposite effect can sometimes be obtained (Blanco et al., 2011; Koller 
and Kaplan, 1978; Matute, 1996).  For example, Matute (1996) studied causality judgments 
using a procedure in which participants worked for outcomes, and noted higher causal ratings 
when there were higher numbers of response-independent outcomes presented despite this 
finding being at odds with the straightforward interpretations of many theories of judgment.  
When individuals give high ratings of causal control in situations when their actions are not 
directly controlling the outcome, this can be termed ‘an illusion of control’ (Langer, 1975), 
and this is of relevance to many situations, including those related to clinical (Alloy and 
Abramson, 1979) and economic (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2003; Langer, 1975) settings. 
Experimentally, the illusion of control effect appears to be found when the rate at 
which outcomes are delivered, and the rate at which responses are emitted, are high (Blanco, 
Matute, and Vadillo, 2012; Rudski, 2004).  A similar finding has also been observed in the 
nonhuman instrumental conditioning literature, and is often termed ‘superstitious 
conditioning’.  Although the presentation of response-independent reinforcers typically 
depresses responding (Burgess and Wearden, 1981), presenting response-independent 
reinforcement can sometimes result in higher rates of instrumental responding (Lattal and 
Bryan, 1976; Rudski, Lischner, and Albert, 1999; Skinner, 1948).  This is particularly noted 
when rates of response-dependent reinforcement are low (Lattal and Bryan, 1976).  Similarly, 
in the associative conditioning literature, potentiation rather than overshadowing of learning 
about a target by another cue, when the target-outcome relationship is weak, has been found 
(Clarke, Westbrook, & Irwin, 1979; Schachtman, Reed, & Hall, 1987). 
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Thus, there are multiple demonstrations that response-independent outcomes can 
sometimes facilitate human causal judgments and also rates of instrumental conditioning in 
nonhumans (Blanco et al., 2012; Lattal and Bryan, 1976).  If this type of effect were noted 
using human participants in a ‘naturalistic’ judgment paradigm (i.e., one in which outcomes 
had some value, see Matute, 1996), it is unclear how it could easily be accommodated into 
many theories of judgments of control that assume competition between the target response 
and the context as sources of prediction for the outcome (Allan, 1993; Cheng, 1997).  
However, one possible explanation of this effect is derived from the conditioning literature, 
and concerns the impact of response-independent reinforcement on motivation (Dickinson 
and Dawson, 1988; Holmes, Marchand, and Coutureau, 2010; Nevin and Grace, 2000).  Here 
it can be assumed that such response-independent outcomes may drive responding through 
increasing the motivational value of the context (Nevin and Grace, 2000).  This effect is often 
referred to as ‘Pavlovian-to-Instrumental’ Transfer (Holmes et al., 2010; Rescorla and 
Solomon, 1967), and it is suggested that incentive motivation conditioned to the Pavlovian 
CS energizes instrumental responding (Holland and Gallagher, 2003).  In the current context, 
Pavlovian conditioned incentive motivation may accrue to the context and, subsequently, 
may energize instrumental responding performed in that context (Nevin and Grace, 2000).  
For example, pigeons respond at a low rate when response-independent reinforcement is 
superimposed over a schedule of response-dependent reinforcement, but, when placed in 
extinction, responding continues proportionally to the combined rate of response-dependent 
and independent reinforcement previously obtained in that context (Nevin and Grace, 2000).  
However, such an effect has not been noted for humans. 
This suggestion implies that response-independent outcomes, under some conditions, 
might maintain motivation to respond, and this would explain why response rates sometimes 
increase with response-independent outcomes (see Lattal and Bryan, 1976).  In terms of 
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judgements of causality, if the response-independent outcomes maintained responding in the 
above manner, this may give rise to spurious coincidences between their responses and 
outcomes, that are actually unrelated to those responses, but happen to take place close in 
time.  This would tend to increase ratings of causal effectiveness that are given in that 
context.  This account of an illusion of control is similar to the one offered by Blanco et al. 
(2011).  This explanation may only hold for contexts that were not already relatively highly 
conditioned – i.e., those in which reinforcement already occurred at a reasonably high rate.    
The current experiments explored the impact of response-independent outcome 
delivery across a range of different response-dependent conditions in a naturalistic judgment 
task, and investigated the extent to which this impacts on rates of response, judgments of 
control, and the motivation to continue responding in the same context.  Should similar 
findings to those discussed above be obtained, they would prove difficult for many theories 
of judgments of control, although they would be consistent with the operation of Pavolvian-
to-instrumental transfer in these situations. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
 A causal judgment task retaining aspects of an instrumental conditioning procedure, 
and which has previously been used to show similarities between response rates and causal 
judgments, was employed (Reed, 1999; see also Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003).  The task 
involved making ‘investments’ that involved some ‘cost’ (the response) in order to maximize 
‘returns’ (the outcome), in a number of different ‘countries’ (the contexts).  Participants 
received exposure to high- or low-probabilities of response-dependent outcomes, and to 
different rates of response-independent outcomes.  If previous findings are to be extended to 
causal judgments, then, in the absence of response-independent outcomes, rates of response 
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and judgments of causality should be higher with a higher-probability of a response-
dependent outcome (Allan, 1993; Reed, 1999).  For the high-probability response-dependent 
groups, response-independent outcomes should decrease responding (Allan, 1983), although, 
if response rates are high, then an illusion of control might be seen in the higher-rate 
response-independent condition (Blanco et al., 2012).  In contrast, for the low-probability 
response-dependence group, response-independent outcome might serve to boost response 
rates (Lattal and Bryan, 1976).  Participants were also asked to rate their motivation to return 
to the ‘country’ to invest again, and this rating should increase as the total rate of outcomes 
(irrespective of their source) increases (Nevin and Grace, 2000).  The above findings would 
be predicted by the operation of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, but not by most theories 
of causal judgment. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight participants (27 female and 21 male), with a mean age of 21.65 (+ 3.06; 
range 18 – 36) years old, were recruited.  This sample size was selected on the basis of 
previous research in the area.  All were volunteers, and none was paid for their participation.  
Ethical approval was obtained from the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Apparatus 
 The experiment was conducted on a BBC computer which controlled events displayed 
on the screen (24cm x 17cm).  Instructions were presented on the computer-screen, and 
participants responded via the keyboard. 
 
Procedure 
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 Participants were tested individually in a small experimental-room.  Participants were 
presented with the following instructions via a screen: 
“You have been given the job of testing the economies of a number of different 
countries.  You must test how well your investments do, and report to the company that has 
hired you.”  Press the RETURN key to continue. 
  “You can make an investment by pressing the SPACE BAR of the computer.  Each 
press will subtract money from your investment-fund.  You may, or may not, receive income 
from the investment.  Should you receive income, £1,000 will be added to your fund.  You are 
free to make an investment at any time.”  Press the RETURN key to continue. 
“After a period of time, you will be asked to report to the board on your activities.  
They will want to see a good return on your investment.  They will also want you to give an 
estimate concerning a number of aspects of the time that you spent investing in that country.  
You will be required to give a rating on a scale of ZERO to 100 on aspects of the economy.  
Zero is always used to indicate a low rating on that aspect, and 100 is always used to 
indicate a high rating on that aspect.”  Press the RETURN key to continue 
“You will be involved in testing a number of different countries.  Due to the nature of 
the economies of the various countries, it is to your advantage to invest some of the time, and 
not to invest some of the time.”  Press the RETURN key to start. 
Participants in each of the two groups were then each exposed to the three conditions.  
The relationship between an investment (response) and a return (outcome) differed between 
the two groups.  Both groups received response-dependent outcomes on a random ratio (RR) 
schedule; an RR-5 (i.e., each response had a .20 probability of producing an outcome), or an 
RR-15 schedule (i.e., each response had a .066 probability of an outcome).  When an 
outcome was delivered, £1,000 was added to the investment-fund displayed in the middle of 
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the screen, and the words “Successful Investment” were presented above the investment-fund 
running total for 1s.  The investment-fund started at £20,000 for each condition. 
Each group was exposed to the same three conditions (‘countries’), presented in one 
of six counterbalanced orders.  Each condition was clearly labelled: ‘Country 1’, ‘Country 2’, 
or ‘Country 3’, which appeared on the bottom of the screen during the condition.  These 
conditions differed in the level of response-independent outcomes: none – no response-
independent outcomes; lean – response- independent outcomes delivered on a variable time 
(VT) 60s schedule; and rich – response-independent outcomes delivered on a VT 20s 
schedule.  When these response-independent outcomes were delivered, £1,000 was added to 
the investment-fund, and the words “Government Subsidy” appeared just above the 
investment-fund total. 
Each condition lasted for 10 min, following which the screen would clear, and the 
participants would be asked the following two questions (in a random order across 
participants and across conditions). 
“How effective on a scale of 0 to 100 was an investment in this country?”  Type your 
judgment.” 
The participant then typed their judgment using the keyboard, and the screen cleared 
and the following question was asked: 
“How much on a scale of 0 to 100 would you like to return to this country to continue 
investing?”  Type your judgment.” 
 The question regarding the effectiveness of the response was that used previously in 
studies of the impact of this procedure on such judgments (e.g., Reed, 1999).  The second 
question aimed to assess the degree to which the context became valued, and was developed 
after testing the questions on 10 participants (not included in the experiment) regarding what 
they thought the question assessed. 
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Results and Discussion 
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 
---------------------------- 
 Figure 1 displays the mean responses per min for the two groups, for each of the three 
response-independent outcome conditions.  Response rates for the RR-5 group were generally 
higher than those for the RR-15 group.  This difference diminished as the probability of 
response-independent outcomes increased; manifest in an increase in response rate for the 
RR-15 group as the VT schedule became richer. 
A two-factor mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with group (RR-5 versus 
RR-15) as a between-subject factor, and VT condition (none x VT-60 x VT-20), was 
conducted on these data.  This analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
group, F(1,46) = 8.55, p < .005, partial eta2 = .157, no main effect of VT condition, F(2,92) 
= 1.39, p > .25, partial eta2 = .029, but a statistically significant interaction between the two 
factors, F(2,92) = 8.19, p < .001, partial eta2 = .151.  Simple effects conducted for group at 
each level of VT condition revealed a statistically significant simple effect of group with no 
VT schedule, F(1,92) = 29.82, p < .001, partial eta2 = .345, a significant but smaller effect 
with VT-60, F(1,92) = 4.94, p < .05, partial eta2 = .092, but no difference between the RR 
groups with a VT-20 schedule, F(1,92) = 0.06, p > .80, partial eta2 = .001.  Simple effect 
analyses conducted between each condition for the groups, separately, revealed a statistically 
significant difference across VT condition for the RR-15 group, F(2,92) = 7.97, p < .001, = 
partial eta2 = .298, but not for the RR-5 group, F(2,92) = 1.62, p > .30, = partial eta2 = .056. 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 
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---------------------------- 
 Figure 2 displays the mean judgments of causal effectiveness (left panel), and 
motivation to revisit the country (right panel).  Judgments (left panel) were generally higher 
for the RR-5 compared to the RR-15 group.  This difference decreased as the VT schedule 
became richer, with a reduction in judgment for the RR-5 group, and an increase in judgment 
for the RR-15 group, as the VT schedule became richer. 
A two-factor mixed-model ANOVA (group x VT condition) was conducted on these 
data and revealed a statistically significant main effect of group, F(1,46) = 91.35, p < .001, 
partial eta2 = .665, no main effect of VT condition, F(2,92) = 1.07, p > .30, partial eta2 = 
.023, but a statistically significant interaction between the two factors, F(2,92) = 43.23, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .484.  Simple effects conducted for group at each level of VT condition 
revealed a statistically significant simple effect of group with no VT schedule, F(1,92) = 
222.07, p < .001, partial eta2 = .799, and  with VT-60, F(1,92) = 48.82, p < .001, partial eta2 
= .394, but no difference between the RR groups with a VT-20 schedule, F(1,92) = 3.50, p > 
.10, partial eta2 = .055.  Simple effect analyses conducted between each condition for the 
groups, separately, revealed a statistically significant increasing linear trend for the RR-15 
group, F(1,92) = 56.63, p < .001, = partial eta2 = .768, and a significant decreasing linear 
trend for the RR-5 group, F(1,92) = 30.30, p < .001, = partial eta2 = .530. 
Inspection of the data for motivation to revisit the country (Figure 2, right panel) 
reveals a different pattern of data from response rates and judgments of causality.  Motivation 
ratings were higher for the RR-5 group than for the RR-15 group.  However, response-
independent reinforcement tended to increase ratings for the RR-15, but not the RR-5, group.  
A two-factor mixed-model ANOVA (group x VT condition) conducted on these data 
revealed statistically significant main effects of group, F(1,46) = 103.29, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .692, and VT condition, F(2,92) = 27.48, p < .001, partial eta2 = .374, and a 
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statistically significant interaction between the two factors, F(2,92) = 16.63, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .266.  Simple effects conducted for group at each level of VT condition revealed 
statistically significant simple effects of group with no VT schedule, F(1,92) = 174.20, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .720, and with VT-60, F(1,92) = 39.92, p < .001, partial eta2 = .323, and 
with a VT-20 schedule, F(1,92) = 35.40, p > .001, partial eta2 = .489.  Simple effect analyses 
conducted between each condition for the groups, separately, revealed a statistically 
significant increasing linear trend for the RR-15 group, F(1,92) = 78.70, p < .001, = partial 
eta2 = .870, but no significant difference between the conditions for the RR-5 group, F(1,92) 
= 3.33, p > .05, = partial eta2 = .099. 
 Richer schedules of response-dependent outcomes generally produced higher rates of 
response and judgments causation than leaner schedules.  However, this difference was 
reduced when response-independent outcomes were added – reducing both rates and ratings 
on the rich schedule, but increasing rates and judgments on the lean schedule.  These data 
partially replicate previous findings regarding the effect of increasing the rate of response-
independent outcomes on judgments of control (Blanco et al., 2012; Matute, 1996), and 
replicate findings from the free-operant schedule literature showing response-independent 
reinforcement can sometimes increase rates of response (Lattal and Bryan, 1976).  A novel 
aspect of these results is their extension to a naturalistic judgment procedure in which rates of 
response and judgments are controlled in humans in a similar manner to that noted for 
nonhumans.  
--------------------------- 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
--------------------------- 
Table1 shows the group-mean outcomes per min delivered for each group in all 
conditions, as well as the group-mean rates at which scheduled response-dependent, all 
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response-dependent (including chance pairings defined as outcomes delivered within 500ms 
of a response), and response-independent outcomes (excluding programmed response-
dependent outcomes occurring within 500ms of a response).  These data demonstrate that the 
RR-5 group earned more outcomes than the RR-15 group.  There were different impacts of 
the addition of response-independent reinforcers across the two groups.  For the RR-5 group, 
as the FT schedule became richer, there was a decrease in response-dependent reinforcement 
actually produced by responding.  However, as many of the response-independent outcomes 
were emitted in close proximity (500ms) to a response, this maintained the actual level of 
response-dependent outcomes experienced.  Nevertheless, there was an increase in the 
number of response-independent reinforcers delivered in the rich (FT-20) compared to the 
lean (FT-60) condition.  In contrast, for the RR-15 group, the addition of increasing numbers 
of response-independent reinforcement (i.e. FT-20 compared to FT-60) served to maintain 
numbers of response-dependent reinfocers obtained, and the number of reinforcers actually 
delivered in the absence of a response decreased.      
 Table 2 shows the correlations between all three outcome measures (response rate, 
judgment of causality, and judgment of motivation) and the number of outcomes presented, 
in terms of the total outcomes, response-dependent outcomes, and response-independent 
outcomes (excluding those that occurred with 500ms of a response).  These data are 
displayed for each of the three conditions across the entire sample.  Inspection of these data 
reveals that, in all three conditions, the three outcome variables were significantly correlated 
with one another, although less strongly in the two conditions where there were response-
independent reinforcements. 
The relationship between response rate and outcomes, and between causal judgment 
and outcomes, were similar to one another.  This correlation was positive with total 
outcomes, and also with response-dependent outcomes; but, when considering just the 
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response-independent outcomes, this relationship was negative.  Testing between the related 
correlation coefficients for response rate and outcome and judgement and outcome, for each 
of the three sources of outcome, revealed that in no case was the difference between the 
correlations between response rate and outcomes, and causal judgment and outcomes, 
significant, all ts < 1. 
In contrast, while the relationship between motivation judgment and the number of 
outcomes delivered was positive for total outcomes and response-dependent outcomes, and 
this correlation did not differ from that noted with response rate or causal judgment for either 
lean or rich conditions, all ts < 1, the relationship between motivation judgment and 
response-independent outcomes was positive for both the lean and the rich condition.  There 
was a significant difference between the correlations with response-independent outcomes 
between motivation and response rate in the lean, t(47) = 10.82, p < .001, and rich conditions, 
t(47) = 6.26, p < .01, and also between the motivation judgment and causal judgment for the 
lean, t(47) = 3.91, p < .01, and rich, t(47) = 6.43, p < .01, conditions. 
These results suggest that the effect of adding response-independent reinforcement 
was dependent upon the degree to which response-independent reinforcement actually 
produced chance pairings with responses.  To the extent that this occurred, rates of response 
and judgments of causal effectiveness increased.  To the extent that there were outcomes 
presented that were not delivered in close temporal proximity to a response, response rates 
and causality judgments decreased.  These findings are in line with most views of the impact 
of response-dependent and response-independent outcomes (see Allen, 1980). 
However, this cannot be the full explanation of the results, as the impact of the 
scheduled response-independent outcomes was determined by the schedule of response-
dependent outcomes in a manner that was not predictable from response rates alone.  It has 
been suggested that higher rates of response would lead to more chance pairings of responses 
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with scheduled outcomes that are not response-dependent, leading to an illusion of control 
(Blanco et al., 2011; 2012).  If this were the case, and only the increase in chance pairings 
between responses and putative response-independent outcomes was responsible for the 
findings, then the response-independent outcomes might have been expected to have a greater 
impact in the RR-5 condition which generated higher rats of response.  This was not the case, 
suggesting an additional mechanism might mediate this effect. 
In fact the present findings regarding the impact of the level of outcome delivery on 
the ratings given to the context are in line with findings from behavioral momentum studies 
(Nevin and Grace, 2000).  These results suggest that context conditioning (here measured by 
ratings of motivation to revisit the context/country) may be interacting with the probability of 
response-dependent outcomes to jointly determine response rates and causal judgments.  This 
effect may potentially be mediated through the operation of Pavlovian-to-instrumental 
transfer (Rescorla and Soloman, 1967).  Increased context conditioning may elicit greater 
levels of responding in the RR-15 condition, leading to more responses and greater numbers 
of chance pairings between responses and outcomes scheduled to occur independently of 
responding.  That this effect is most pronounced when response-outcome levels are weak fits 
with the literature on enhancement and potentiation of associations in classical conditioning 
(Clarke et al., 1979), and also with some findings regarding response-independent 
reinforcement in nonhumans (Lattal and Bryan, 1976). 
 
Experiment 2 
 
 Experiment 2 sought to explore a further effect noted in instrumental conditioning that 
might provide an explanation of the current findings.  In addition to superstitious 
conditioning with biologically significant outcomes, a similar illusion of control finding has 
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been noted with informational stimuli – often termed ‘sensory superstition’ (Morse and 
Skinner, 1957).  That is, a rating of causal effectiveness is given to a target when it is 
followed by any stimulus, irrespective of whether it is the outcome of interest or not.  Indeed, 
Osborne and Shelby (1975) have suggested changes in sensory presentations in the 
environments can motivate responding, which might suggest that any additional stimulus 
change, if delivered at a sufficiently high rate, might serve to increase levels of context 
conditioning.  In the response-independent conditions, the rate of stimulus presentation may 
have impacted on the ratings through this mechanism – an explanation which may also apply 
to the previous findings of Matute (1996; Blanco et al., 2011; 2012).  
The literature regarding Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer is mixed with respect to 
whether the response-independent outcome needs to be of the same type as the response-
dependent outcome to produce the motivating effect of responding (see Holmes et al., 2010, 
for a review).  The current experiment sought to test this with respect to such ‘naturalistic 
procedures’ in judgment of control tasks.  If the response-independent outcome did not have 
to be similar to the response-dependent outcome, then a similar sensory-reinforcement 
induced effect might be seen, which could accommodate the results from Experiment 1 
without recourse to incentive motivation effects.  However, if the effect works through the 
conditioning of motivation to the context, then an illusion of control should only be observed 
in the condition with a response-independent outcome similar to the one produced by 
responding.    
   
Method 
 Twenty-four participants (14 female and 10 male), with a mean age of 21.08 (+ 2.60; 
range 18 – 28) years old, were recruited.  All were volunteers, and none was paid for their 
participation.  The apparatus was as described in Experiment 1. 
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All participants responded on an RR-15 schedule of response-dependent outcome 
presentation, and experienced three conditions (in one of six counterbalanced orders).  In one 
condition (none), participants received no response-independent outcomes or stimulation.  In 
a second condition (financial), participants received response-independent outcomes on a 
VT-20s schedule.  In a final condition (information), participants received no financial 
response-independent outcomes, but informational stimuli on a VT-20s schedule.  These 
informational stimuli related to the economic situation in the hypothetical country (i.e., 
‘Inflation is Stable.”), and were presented just above the investment-fund.  All other details of 
the experiment were as described in Experiment 1.      
 
Results and Discussion 
---------------------------- 
Figure 3 
---------------------------- 
 Figure 3 displays the mean responses per min for the three conditions.  Response rates 
for the financial response-independent outcomes were higher than those for the other two 
conditions.  A repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on these data revealed a statistically 
significant main effect of condition, F(2,46) = 5.12, p < .01, partial eta2 = .182.  Paired t-tests 
revealed the Financial condition had a higher response rate than the None, t(23) = 3.04, p < 
.005, and Information, t(23) = 2.01, 0.06 > p > .05, conditions.  The None and Informational 
conditions did not differ from one another, t(23) = 1.42, p > .10. 
---------------------------- 
Figure 4 
---------------------------- 
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 Figure 4 displays the mean judgments of causal effectiveness (left panel), and 
motivation to revisit the country (right panel).  Judgments and motivation were higher in the 
Financial condition than in the other two conditions.  A repeated-measures ANOVA 
conducted on the causal judgment data revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
condition, F(2,46) = 20.74, p < .001, partial eta2 = .474.  Paired t-tests revealed the Financial 
condition had a judgments of causal effectiveness than the None, t(23) = 6.31, p < .001, and 
the Information, , t(23) = 5.72, p < .05, conditions.  The None and Informational conditions 
did not differ from one another, t(23) = 0.06, p > .90.  A repeated-measures ANOVA 
conducted on the motivation ratings revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
condition, F(2,46) = 39.29, p < .001, partial eta2 = .631.  Paired t-tests revealed the Financial 
condition had a higher response rate than the None, t(23) = 10.69, p < .001, and the 
Information, , t(23) = 7.03, p < .001.  The None and Informational conditions did not differ 
from one another, t(23) = 0.01, p > .90. 
 These data replicated the effect of response-independent financial outcomes on a 
relatively lean (RR-15) schedule of response-dependent outcomes seen in Experiment 1.  
However, superimposing information relevant to the task had no such impact on rates of 
response, or judgments of causal effectiveness or motivation.  This suggests that the 
response-independent outcomes did not impact ratings of the context through sensory 
superstition (Morse and Skinner, 1957), and that the effect of response-independent 
reinforcement is limited to situations in which this outcome is of the same type of the 
response-dependent reinforcement (Holmes et al., 2010). 
--------------------------- 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
--------------------------- 
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Table 3 shows the group-mean outcomes per min delivered in all conditions, as well 
as the group-mean rates at which scheduled response-dependent, all response-dependent 
(including chance pairings defined as outcomes delivered within 500ms of a response), and 
response-independent outcomes (excluding programmed response-dependent outcomes 
occurring within 500ms of a response).  As in Experiment 1, many of the programmed 
response-independent reinforcers were delivered within 500ms of a response, and served to 
increase the level of response-dependent reinforcement obtained.  Table 3 also shows the rate 
at which financial and informational outcomes were delivered for the Info condition.  The 
former rates were similar to those seen in the None condition, and the rates of all outcomes 
(combining both financial and informational) were similar to those noted in the Finance 
condition.   
 Table 4 shows the correlations between all three outcome measures (response rate, 
judgment of causality, and judgment of motivation) and the number of financial outcomes 
presented, in terms of the total outcomes, response-dependent financial outcomes, and 
response-independent financial outcomes (excluding those that occurred with 500ms of a 
response).  Inspection of these data reveals that, in all three conditions, the three outcome 
variables were significantly correlated with one another. 
The relationship between response rate and outcomes, and between causal judgment 
and outcomes, were both positive with all outcomes, and with response-dependent outcomes.  
In contrast these relationships were negative for the response-independent outcomes.  Testing 
between the related correlation coefficients for response rate and outcome and judgement and 
outcome, for each of the three sources of outcome, revealed that in no case was the difference 
between the correlations between response rate and outcomes and causal judgment and 
outcome significant, all ts < 1. 
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The relationship between motivation judgment and the number of outcomes delivered 
was positive for total outcomes and response-dependent outcomes, and this correlation did 
not differ from that noted with response rate or causal judgment for either lean or rich 
conditions, all ts < 1.  The relationship between motivation judgment and response-
independent outcomes was positive for both the Finance and Info conditions.  In the Financial 
condition, there was a significant difference between the correlations with response-
independent outcomes between response rate and motivation judgement, t(23) = 4.87, p < 
.05, and causal judgment and motivation judgment, t(23) = 2.91, p < .05.  In the Info 
condition, there was a significant difference between the correlations with response-
independent outcomes between response rate and motivation judgement, t(23) = 3.72, p < 
.05, and causal judgment and motivation judgment, t(23) = 2.98, p < .05. 
 
General Discussion 
  
Most theories of human causal judgments predict some form of competition between 
the target and alternative predictors of outcome (the context).  These views suggest, as one 
predictor increases in strength, the other should decrease.  The current data are problematic in 
this regard, as they show this simple relationship does not always hold (Blanco et al., 2012).  
Although there are plenty of demonstrations that context conditioning can suppress learning 
(Dickinson and Charnock, 1985; Reed and Reilly, 1990), other findings suggest this is only 
the case when the target-outcome association is strong, and that additional cues present 
during conditioning can sometimes potentiate an otherwise weak target-outcome association 
(Clarke et al., 1979; Schachtman et al., 1987).  These findings imply, for this procedure, 
alternative accounts of the factors impacting human judgments of causation should be 
considered, including Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (Rescorla and Soloman, 1967). 
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As with judgments of causal effectiveness, response-independent reinforcement 
typically depresses response rate (Lattal, 1974), but this effect does not always occur (Lattal 
and Bryan, 1976).  In the current studies, adding response-independent reinforcement 
enhanced responding when background rates of dependent reinforcement were low.  
Although response-independent reinforcement often reduces rates of target responding by 
reinforcing alternative behaviors (Eldridge, Pear, Torgrud, and Evers, 1988), there were very 
few competing behaviors available in the current procedure, meaning this attenuating effect 
would not be pronounced, and leaving the motivating effect of response-independent 
reinforcement on the context to be observed more readily. 
This enhancement of responding can be taken as analogous to a ‘reinstatement’ effect, 
where extinguished responding returns following delivery of response-independent 
reinforcement (Dimidjian et al., 2011; Frank and Lattal, 1976).  This effect is often attributed 
to the motivating impact of the context in which responding occurs (Nevin and Grace, 2000).  
Consistent with this view, ratings of the context did vary with the level of reinforcement 
(both earned and free) associated with that context.  Also consistent with this view, is the 
finding that there were no effects of response-independent outcomes on the ratings of 
motivation of participants in the RR-5 in Experiment 1.  If motivation was at ceiling in this 
group, due to the high rate of reinforcement, it would not be surprising that increasing 
response-independent outcomes failed to produce an increase in response-rates and 
judgments: any ability of this variable to improve motivation is already at ceiling. 
Of course, there are some potential alternative explanations that deserve brief 
mention.  For example, where no response-independent outcomes are delivered, it might be 
easier to estimate the amount of control over the outcome, which is why large differences in 
judgments and response rates are observed.  However, as the number of response-
independent outcomes increases, this inference might become increasingly difficult.  When 
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this difficulty becomes maximal (i.e., in the ‘rich’ conditions), participants are no longer able 
to give an accurate estimate of their degree of control and, consequently, give intermediate 
judgments.  This is consistent with Cheng’s (1997) theory that, as the probability of the 
outcome in the absence of the cause increases to a maximal level, inferences about the causal 
power of the response become less and less certain.  
If the Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer account of the impact of background 
conditioning were also to be applied to judgments of causal effectiveness, it would imply 
accounts of responding, such as behavioral momentum accounts (Nevin and Grace, 2000), 
may have some utility in explaining human judgments of causal effectiveness, including the 
phenomenon of illusion of control.   
Of course there are a number of issues that should be considered when interpreting 
these data.  Given the difference between the effects of response-independent reinforcement 
in the RR-5 and RR-15 of Experiment 1, it would be worthwhile for further studies to address 
the effects of parametric variations in the values of the response dependent and the VT 
schedules).  Moreover, the impact of the questions used to assess the degree to which the 
context was conditioned could also be examined further to assess the exact nature of what is 
being judged.  However, it should be noted that this rating scale differed in terms of its 
relationship to the various forms of outcome presented in manners predicted by behavioural 
momentum – that is, motivation was directly related to outcomes irrespective of their source, 
which was not true for effectiveness judgments – which suggests that this question was 
assessing a different aspect of the contingency to the effectiveness question.  In this regard it 
is worth pointing out that an important aspect of behavioural momentum theory is the relation 
between the ‘persistence-enhancing’ effects of contextual stimuli, and the choice of such 
contexts.  The current motivational judgment question appears to assess the latter, and this 
could be further explored. 
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In summary, the present results suggest that context conditioning may interact with 
the level of experienced response-dependent outcomes to determine response rates and causal 
judgments.  Increased context conditioning may produce greater levels of responding, leading 
to more responses and greater numbers of chance pairings between responses and outcomes 
scheduled to occur independently of responding.   
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1.  Results from Experiment 1.  Mean rates of response for the two groups (receiving 
response-dependent reinforcement according to an RR-5 or RR015 schedule), in the three 
conditions: None = no response-independent reinforcement; Lean = response-independent 
reinforcement delivered on an FT-60s schedule); Rich = response-independent reinforcement 
delivered on an FT-20s schedule).  Error bars are 95% confidence limits. 
 
Figure 2.  Results from Experiment 1.  Mean rates of causal effectiveness and motivation for 
the two groups (receiving response-dependent reinforcement according to an RR-5 or RR015 
schedule), in the three conditions: None = no response-independent reinforcement; Lean = 
response-independent reinforcement delivered on an FT-60s schedule); Rich = response-
independent reinforcement delivered on an FT-20s schedule).  Error bars are 95% confidence 
limits. 
 
Figure 3.  Results from Experiment 2.  Mean rates of response in the three conditions: None = 
no response-independent reinforcement; Finance = money response-independently delivered 
on an FT-20s schedule); Information = information response-independently delivered on an 
FT-20s schedule).  Error bars are 95% confidence limits. 
 
Figure 4.  Results from Experiment 2.  Mean rates of causal effectiveness and motivation in 
the three conditions: None = no response-independent reinforcement; Finance = money 
response-independently delivered on an FT-20s schedule); Information = information 
response-independently delivered on an FT-20s schedule).  Error bars are 95% confidence 
limits. 
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Table1: Experiment 1.  Group-mean (standard deviation) outcomes per min delivered 
for each group in all conditions, as well as the group-mean rates at which scheduled 
response-dependent, all response-dependent (including chance pairings defined as 
outcomes delivered within 500ms of a response), and response-independent outcomes 
(excluding programmed response-dependent outcomes occurring within 500ms of a 
response).  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Outcomes Scheduled All  Response  
dependent dependent independent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
RR-5 None  12.75 (4.99) 12.75 (4.99) 12.75 (4.99) 0    
 Lean  12.38 (3.93) 11.38 (3.94) 12.75 (4.99) 0.18 (.22) 
 Rich  13.97 (5.44) 10.97 (5.45) 13.40 (6.16) 0.57 (.71) 
RR-15 None    2.36   (.88)  2.36 (.88) 2.36 (.88)   0 
 Lean    4.03 (1.15) 3.03 (1.15) 3.72 (1.38) 3.08 (2.41) 
 Rich    6.74 (1.44) 3.74 91.44) 4.01 (1.55) 2.73 (1.17) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 2.  Experiment 1.  Correlations between all three outcome measures and the 
outcomes presented for the sample as a whole. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
None      Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .660***      
Motivation   .648*** .923***   
Total outcomes  .918*** .841*** .827*** 
Response dependent  .918*** .841*** .827*** 
Response independent         -       - 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Lean      Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .467***      
Motivation   .306*** .668***   
Total outcomes  .737*** .710*** .625*** 
Response dependent  .757*** .715*** .616*** 
Response independent           -.927***         -.354*             .201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Rich      Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .443**      
Motivation   .267*  .542***   
Total outcomes  .654*** .525*** .671*** 
Response dependent  .596*** .513*** .703*** 
Response independent           -.297            -.400**            .765*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 3: Experiment 2.  Mean outcomes (standard deviation) per min delivered in all 
conditions, as well as the mean rates at which scheduled response-dependent, all 
response-dependent (including chance pairings defined as outcomes delivered within 
500ms of a response), and response-independent outcomes (excluding programmed 
response-dependent outcomes occurring within 500ms of a response).  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Outcomes Scheduled All  Response  
dependent dependent independent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
None  2.81 (1.42) 2.81 (1.43) 2.81 (1.43) 0    
Finance 6.84 (1.24) 3.85 (1.28) 6.38 (1.74) 0.47 (.51) 
Info (all) 6.33 (1.04) 3.33 (1.05) 5.65 (1.59) 0.68 (.56) 
Info (rein) 3.33 (1.05) 3.33 (1.05) 3.33 (1.05) 0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 4. Experiment 2.  Correlations between all three outcome measures and the 
outcomes presented. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
None      Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .493**      
Motivation   .349*  .490**   
Total outcomes  .998*** .493**  .349* 
Response dependent  .998*** .493**  .349* 
Response independent         -       -      - 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Finance     Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .657***      
Motivation   .763*** .642***   
Total outcomes  .998*** .657*** .763*** 
Response dependent  .998*** .630*** .734*** 
Response independent           -.836***         -.498*             .586** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Info      Response  Causal     Motivation   
      Rate  Judgment Judgment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Causal judgement  .670***      
Motivation   .585**  .701***   
Total outcomes  .999*** .670*** .585*** 
Response dependent  .994*** .648*** .581** 
Response independent           -.953***         -.587**             .557*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
